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Abstract: Decision making is the most important and the most difficult task that 
managers perform. On the other side they are most of the time confronted with risk 
and uncertainty, especially in banking industry. Objective of this study is to examine 
how managers of commercial banks performs this task, by putting it in the perspective 
of the newest findings from Behavioral finance field. Behavioral finance is based on 
premise that decision makers behave less than fully rational. Due to their deeply rooted 
human nature managers are prone to make decisions based on subjective evaluation 
of available options, relative to certain reference point and to current state of wealth, 
and also according to their personal interests which may contradict banks`, industry`s 
and social welfare`s. Specifically, this study explores role of heuristics, biases and 
intuition in decision making, through concise review of existing literature. Importance 
of the study is in a fact that commercial banks are simultaneously the most important 
industry for country`s economic development and stability and the most submissive 
industry to the risk. Owing to systematic nature of risk generally in financial markets, any 
irregularity in one country`s banking industry will eventually reflect on other countries 
and is able to make ground for crisis. Study will contribute to better understanding of 
managerial perception of risk and their behavior under risk, which is primarily useful 
for architects of banks` corporate governance and banks` regulative. As we will see, 
setting identical option in two different frames leads to different decisions, this opens 
up possibilities to construct an environment in such a manner that decision makers are 
naturally led to make decisions that are in the best interest of all stakeholders involved. 
Keywords: Behavioral Finance, Decision Making, Risk in Banking, Commercial Banking
1. Introduction
While literature is overwhelmed with analysis of risk taking behavior by managers in 
commercial banking, which mainly look at relationship between risk and some other 
significant variables such as size or ownership structure (García-Marco & Robles-
Fernández, 2008) there lacks analysis that takes into consideration factors of managers` 
behavior – acting individually and in groups. 
Mainstream economists argue that economic agents are rational utility maximizers 
who hold constant preferences and all together create efficient markets. However, 
such postulate is invalid, since irrationality of economic agents was recognized a long 
time ago, even by Adam Smith. (Santos & Chen, 2009) 
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Not only that this postulate is incorrect in theory, but is troublesome for practitioners, 
specifically banks` owners and stakeholders, banking regulative bodies, and public 
in general. So, basic purpose of this research is to expand the view on managerial 
behavior in commercial banks, especially under risk environment. 
Hillson (2014) notes that risk management process which does not cover findings 
from human behavior sciences, in its foundation is condemned to produce less than 
optimal outcomes. For banking industry it is a must to include soft behavioral factors in 
risk management processes, which are at least as relevant as statistics.
Markets and therefore decision making settings are characterized with complexity, 
uncertainty and risk (Krohling & Souza, 2012), which is especially relevant when it comes 
to banking industry. Banks act as society`s integrator, since these are institutions that 
come in relationship with almost all citizens and all businesses (Marous, 2015).
Banks hold highest ratios in market capitalizations of any country, are subject to illiquidity 
risks, and most importantly the risk they impose is of systematic nature. Turbulences in 
one bank spread to whole banking industry in the country, therefore weakening its 
whole financial system. (Shen & Chih, 2005)
Shen and Chih (2005) note also that one of sources of risk in banks is its asset structure, 
which is difficult to recognize and therefore to prevent. 
This risk is, author suggest, imposed by managers, since they are the ones who make 
final decisions on bank`s asset structure. Therefore, specific field covered by this 
research is behavioral corporate finance, which aims to provide insights into what 
drives managers in their decision making processes.
Authors of the research suggest that introduction of behavioral factors in risk 
management process can seriously improve its efficiency and therefore contribute 
not only to business success of banks individually, but to increase of the overall social 
welfare. Research will provide insights into ways that managers make decisions, which 
is especially important under overwhelming risky settings. It is authors` suggestion that 
only by better understanding of the true nature and true behavior of managers in real 
situations, academicians and practitioners can better form bank`s internal structure 
and hierarchical relationships, as well as banking industry`s regulations. Following this 
assumption, study contributes to better understanding of bank`s executives, which 
is beneficial mainly to regulators of bank`s internal organization and regulators of 
banking industry.  
Research provides literature review of previous research on the given topic. Firstly, 
authors give introduction into field of behavioral corporate finance, which is followed 
with discussion on decision making processes and risk in banking industry. Third part is 
dedicated to implications of behavioral finance in decision making processes. Finally, 
at the very end authors give concluding remarks. 
2. Literature Review
1.1 Behavioral Finance
Behavioral finance is a branch of behavioral economics which is based on notion 
that financial market movements should be studied starting from the assumption of 
managers` incomplete rationality (Glaser, Noth, & Weber, 2003). 
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It is a field of research which combines standard finance theory with sciences on 
human nature - namely psychology, neuroscience, and sociology (Halaba & Ilgun, 
2014). 
Therefore, behavioral economics in general is un upgrade to mainstream economics, 
which enables academicians and practitioners to gain better understanding of 
economic agents` behavior (Rabin, 1998), which is the main purpose of this research. 
It is important to draw attention to „upgrading“ role of behavioral finance. Aim of 
behavioral finance studies is not to contradict mainstream studies, rather to enrich 
them, expand the views and enable more efficient management as well as policy 
making.
Since the scope of the study is managerial behavior, specifically the study is under the 
umbrella of corporate behavioral finance.
1.1.1 Behavioral Corporate Finance
Corporate finance examines decision making (where we can consider financing 
decision, i.e. asset structure) in terms of cooperation and relationship between 
managers and owners (Baker & Wurgler, 2011). Under the agency theory, corporate 
finance is explained in terms of influence of capital owners on managers, with purpose 
of directing managers to behave in the most beneficial manner (Caprio & Levine, 
2002).
Caprio and Levine (2002) emphasize the importance of effective corporate governance 
in banks, since these have influence on “shaping capital allocation at the firm level 
and at the country level“ (p. 2) and Schmidt and Tyrell not that even back in 1997 
there was notable increasing interest and recognition of financial markets` (banking 
industry included) role in resource allocation. Corporate governance is of systemic 
nature, meaning that all of its segments are interrelated, so that every incremental 
change in one segment contributes to the change in other segments as well (Schmidt 
& Tyrell, 1997).
When it comes to mainstream economics, generally it is based on methodological 
approach, mathematical expression of assumptions, and analytical evaluation 
of implications of assumptions and empirical observations (Rabin, 1998). Therefore, 
intrinsic human attributes of managers which are relevant for decision making, are 
being neglected or perceived as disturbance to the smooth mainstream approach. 
The aim of behavioral corporate finance is to account for all these intrinsic attributes of 
managers and examine what drives their behavior in the real environment. (Berneheim, 
2009; Camerer, 2007)
Tirole (2006) in his, in-depth book „The theory of corporate governance“ gives 
credentials to behavioral finance as a branch that „relaxes the rationality postulate 
that dominates this book.“ (p. 9). He notes two courses present in behavioral corporate 
finance. Focus of one course is managerial irrationality, while focus of the other branch 
is on investors` irrationality. Topic of this research fits in the first course of managerial 
irrationality. However, Tirole decides not to include detail coverage of behavioral 
finance in his studies on corporate governance and stick to standard approach given 
by agency theory for several reasons. He notes that behavioral finance is in its offspring, 
so he finds it early for a broad theoretical recapitulation of corporate governance 
from this approach. So, he finds it lacking behind the agency theory.
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Authors of this research find his reasons as additional motivation for urging the 
involvement of behavioral corporate finance in academic studies as soon as possible, 
in order to raise awareness of its importance and move build up theoretical framework 
in this regard and break such (mis)perception on the power of insights from behavioral 
finance. 
According to Rabin (1998) the importance of behavioral finance in decision making 
reflects in findings that managers in real environment are prone to systematically 
irrational judgments and choices. It is opposite to postulate of mainstream economics 
that managers follow objective statistical laws of probability while making evaluations 
that lead their decisions. 
Behavioral finance gathers evidences on biased, loss averse, fearful, and in other 
regards irrational behavior of managers which result in less than optimum efficiency 
decision making (Halaba & Ilgun, 2014). It contradicts rationality of managers along 
the main postulates set by standard finance decision making theories. These postulates 
are:
- manager exerts constant preferences (Abdulnabi, 2014)
- manager chooses the option with the highest expected objective utility 
(Abdulnabi, 2014) 
- manager makes decisions based on logic and controls his emotions (Hadžić, 
2015).
While these assumptions to some degree serve well, in that they help to simplify reality 
and build economic models, it is necessary to recognize what real decision making is 
actually like. Looking at the real managerial behavior in the actual decision making 
environment is the core objective of behavioral corporate finance (Halaba & Ilgun, 
2014).
In order to understand decision making process in a corporation, it is inevitable to 
form understanding over beliefs and preferences of managers, owners, as well as 
interaction of the  two (Baker & Wurgler, 2011). 
In order to gain this understanding,  in the section 2.3 we will look at patterns of 
judgment and decision making - apparently irrational ones - which managers are 
prone to. Before looking into these patterns, firstly we will provide overview over risk 
decision making in general and risk in banking industry.
1.2 Decision Making Under Risk in Commercial Banking
1.2.1 Decision Making
Decision making can be defined as „process of problem identification and the process 
of solving it“ (Shermerhon, 1996, p. 194).
These are processes that managers are constantly engaged in. Furthermore, decisions 
are made in groups, rather than individually, which makes decision making environment 
more complex. (Dervishi & Ibish, 2014)
Hadžić & Ilgun (2015) note that decision making is marked with huge pressure which 
comes from numerous options and eventually results in sub-optimal decisions. 
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Korte (2003) introduces results of the study done over 300 managerial decision over 
20 years, done by Paul Nutt, published in Nutt`s book „Why decisions fail: Avoiding the 
blunders and traps that lead to debacles“ from 2002. Study revealed that decisions 
which result in optimum outcomes are characterized by the following:
1. A deliberate and thorough study of the claims by a variety of stakeholders
2. Early attention to social and political interests, and 
3. Setting direction based on a cross-section of informed opinion“ (Korte, 2003, p. 
446)
2.2.2 Agency Theory 
The basic theory of corporate governance in economics is agency theory. It assesses 
the relationship between principals – owners and agents – managers within an 
organization, with emphasis on risk perception of both parties. 
Owners are assumed to be risk neutral, following the assumption that they do not 
place entire investing capital in one investment, so only part of their wealth would be 
placed in individual bank. When their entire capital does not depend on performance 
of single bank, owners are likely to be less influenced by their emotions and therefore 
make more deliberate decisions. 
Managers are assumed to be more biased in decision making, since their personal 
incomes depend on the performance of the bank. Income for managers mainly 
comes from regular salaries, but also from different types of bonuses as well. (Wiseman 
& Gomez-Mejla, 1998)
Basically, corporate structure should be such that encourages managers to behave 
in the best interests of owners. However, even despite some clearly established legal 
rules for owner-manager relationships, still there remains challenge of how to apply 
those rules in practice, to ensure that managers really do follow them. (Erner, Klos, & 
Langer, 2013)
So, there are strict rules which direct owner-manager relationship. However, there are 
also bonus schemes, which are designed to motivate managers to behave in a way 
that benefits owners the most. However, Chen, Zhang, Xiao, & Li (2011) conducted 
study on bonus schemes among the five biggest banks in United Kingdom, which 
shows that incentives paid to managers did not result in favorable outcomes. All of 
these banks performed poorly with major liquidity problems. 
2.2.3 Risk in Commercial Banking
Classic definition of the risk is as follows „Risks are uncertainties resulting in adverse 
variations of profitability or in losses.“ (Bessis, 2002, p. 11). However, concept of risk 
is poorly understood (Abdulnabi, 2014) and there are many different definitions out 
there (Riabacke, 2006). 
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So, Riabacke (2006) explains risk by putting it in the context of two other terms. These 
are:
- Certainty, where manager knows for sure what will be outcomes of specific 
actions
- Uncertainty, where manager does not know at all what could be outcomes of 
specific actions.
Risk is in between the above two. It implies that manager knows more than one possible 
outcome for each specific action, where each outcome is expected to occur at 
certain probability. However, manager cannot know whether:
- All outcomes he accounts for are actually all possible ones
- Probabilities he assigns to each outcome are accurate.
„Banking risks are defined as adverse impacts on profitability of several distinct sources
of uncertainty“ (Bessis, 2002, p. 11). 
Basic types of banking risks are: credit risk, interest rate risk, market risk, liquidity 
risk, operational risk, foreign exchange risk, other risks (country risk, settlement risk, 
performance risk) (Bessis, 2002).
Risk taking in banking industry is specific because of the role which this sector has 
in one country. Negative  effects of the risk behavior in single bank influences other 
banks and very soon implications spread over to the financial system and complete 
economy. (García-Marco & Robles-Fernández, 2008)
More complex environment makes it more difficult for managers to evaluate what 
might be outcomes of different options they can choose among (Erner et al., 2013). 
Eventually, it amplifies the risk they encounter. 
1.3 Implications of Behavioral Corporate Finance for Decision Making Under Risk 
1.3.1 Intuition
Intuition can be defined as all those processes which happen in human mind on 
subconscious level (Isenman, 1997).
Hadžić and Ilgun (2015, p.14) provide another more detailed definition of intuition 
by Woiceshyn (2014) who says that „Intuition, or the process of intuiting, is described 
as the inexplicable emergence of a sudden understanding – a “hunch” or a “gut 
feeling” – seemingly out of nowhere but involving the subconscious and one’s 
previous experience, often described as recognition of familiar patterns from previous 
experiences“.
According to evidences from neuroscientists, people do not have conscious control of 
their behavior. They inform us that human brain is influenced by environment in which 
human operates. (Bloom, 2014) 
Therefore, managers cannot make their decisions as dissected from the context in 
which they operate, or influences of other group members.
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Managers are continuously asked to make decisions, which involves solving difficult 
questions under ambiguity, complexity, uncertainty. Confronted with such pressures, 
they tend to make the challenge easier, by swapping the actual problem for an easier 
one. The easier problem is the problem they perceive compatible with the present one, 
but it does not necessarily has to be true. The essence is that they take to the surface a 
problem which they are familiar with, their minds know how to solve it. This swap pattern 
is at fundaments of intuitive judgments and decision making. (Kahneman, 2011) 
Intuitive thinking underlies human thinking, judgment, and decision making overall. 
However in order to be properly utilized in academic circles, its importance has to be 
acknowledged by leading academicians. (Isenman, 1997)




Heuristics are mental shortcuts which managers use when making difficult decisions 
in complex settings. They substitute difficult question with an easier one – which 
might lead decision maker from the essence of the actual problem, or in absence of 
relevant data they reach for available data – which might or might not be relevant for 
a problem at hand, but also might mislead decision maker from the actual problem. 
(Hadžić, 2015)
Following the book „Thinking, Fast and Slow“ by father of behavioral economics 
Daniel Kahneman, which he wrote with priceless help of his colleague and friend 
Amos Tversky, authors of this research count four basic types of heuristics. These are: 
availability, representativeness, anchoring, and affect heuristic. Each of these will be 
discussed in following paragraphs.
2.3.2.1 Availability Heuristic
Availability heuristic is decision making pattern based on information that is easily 
obtainable, that is on information that comes to a mind of managers with an ease 
and effortlessly (Sewell, 2011).
It comes as result of replacing a difficult problem for an easier one and basically solving 
a problem and making a needed decision based on the information that can be 
reached the most easily, even though it might not be relevant for the present situation. 
Such decision making has a power to leave actual problem unresolved, or in the worst 
case make the problem even the more serious one. (Kahneman, 2011)
One way in which bank managers can hurt bank`s asset structure is by following the 
available data from the news, since there is evidence for example that investments 
which are the most prompted up on the media platform, perform the poorest among 
other investments in two years (Sewell, 2011). This example is implicative of how data 
which is the most easily accessible, can be misleading. Managers should not carelessly 
follow the news on the macroeconomic situation or industry performances, but rather 
take an analytical and critical evaluation approach.
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2.3.2.2 Representativeness Heuristic
According to Kahneman (2011), people are wired to seek for certain correlation 
between events and situations to the extent that he refers to human species as to 
„pattern seekers“. Managers as well have a need to fit in any new circumstance 
into specific scheme, give it meaning, purpose and justification. It provides sense of 
control, while loss of control over situation upon which our well-being depends, causes 
negative feelings. 
Instead of objective assessment of events and situations, managers find certain context 
to put  those events and situations in. In that way the actual situation or event loses its 
true context and of course can be misleading for decision making.
It is troublesome especially when this need implies neglect of actual problem that 
needs to be solved. 
So, people have this tendency to perceive events and things which share certain 
attributes as the same (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002). 
If managers misevaluate potency of certain event`s amplitude to disturb their asset 
positions, it can significantly change their risk attitudes and behaviors.
2.3.2.3 Anchoring Heuristic
Managers tend to evaluate options they have at disposal based on what those options 
contribute - either positively or negatively to their current level of returns. It harms their 
choice of options and final decision in a way that they neglect objective final utility 
expected from each of those options. While anchoring their evaluation to a certain 
value or a number, they focus on subjective value  which those options provide them. 
(Helson, 1964; Rabin, 1998)
More worrisome fact is that managers have tendency to anchor their evaluations 
to some values or numbers that are completely unrelated to the prospects they are 
evaluating, as opposed to their current returns level. Reference value upon which 
managers compare their options does not have to have any logical correlation to the 
actual choice they are making. Kahneman (2011)
2.3.2.4 Affect Heuristic
Affect heuristic is based on influence that people`s emotions have on their judgments 
and decision making and according to Kahneman (2011) emotions have the highest 
power in directing the risk attitudes and preferences of managers. Basically, all 
decisions that people make are simply manifestation of their feelings towards specific 
option at certain point in time. 
According to Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic and Johnosn (2000) how managers perceive 
risk and therefore form their risk attitudes which drive their risk behavior is influenced 
primarily by affect heuristic. Prospects which provoke positive emotions with managers, 
they are likely to frame as „a low risk and high benefit“, whereas prospects which 
provoke negative emotions with managers, they are likely to frame as „ high risk and 
low benefit“. 
175ICESoS 2016 - Proceedings Book
Regional Economic Development: Entrepreneurship and Innovation
Another leading behavioral economist Dan Ariely (2008), came to a conclusion that 
people`s emotions obscure their deliberate thinking and have potency to drive their 
behavior. 
According to Kahneman (2011), people make deliberate decisions, except in those 
situations when their emotions take over their deliberate thinking. 
2.3.3 Bias
Bias refers to subconscious, faulty and unreasonable judgment and decision making. 
It fundamentally differs from logical and analytical objective thinking patterns. 
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982)
Biased thinking and acting is a path to situations in which the manager believes that 
he is close to maximizing firm value - and, consequently his incentives - but is in fact 
deviating from this ideal (Baker & Wurgler, 2011). 
Managers, as other humans do not always make judgments logically. Furthermore, 
once formed judgments do not always lead to final decisions in rational and consistent 
way. (M. P. Baker & Wurgler, 2011)
However, there is evidence that certain personal abilities of managers are correlated 
to the performance of the firm (Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen, 2011).
On the other side, Simon (1955) introduced the term bounded rationality, under 
which he assumes that some type of cognitive or information gathering cost prevents 
managers from making fully optimal decisions. Bounded rationality allows managers 
to deal with complex environment by using heuristic. In that manner they manage to 
obtain satisfying performance. Since such approach to decision making has certain 
benefits they should strive at least to diminish sensitivity to their own biases. 
In following sections, authors discuss several most applicable biases when it comes to 
corporate behavior of managers individually and in groups.
2.3.3.1 Confidence and Optimism Bias
These two types of biases are related and feed each other, so are discussed jointly. 
Managers have tendency to overvalue their capabilities and expertise and to be overly 
optimistic over future prospects that they personally feel affection for. Additionally, 
managers tend to put more value on the role that they played in certain achievements 
and successes, than they actually had. (Jarboui & Boujelbene, 2012)
They are prompted to see their circumstances as more favorable than they really are. 
Also, managers usually fail at time management by overestimating their abilities and 
assigning less time for activities than they actually need. (Barberis & Thaler, 2003)
Shiller (2000) notes that people in general have tendency to focus on favorable sides 
and ignore possible negative effects when a new situation arises. 
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While over optimism and overconfidence  can reflect negatively on corporate 
behavior, it has positive sides also when experienced moderately. They encourage 
managers to look for new prospects in environment, increases their self-awareness, 
and makes them utilize their full capacities. (Jarboui & Boujelbene, 2012)
So, in order to benefit from these characteristics, managers have to control for them. 
But, along with complexity of environment and decisions that need to be made, 
managers are additionally burdened with group pressure. Group decision making 
feeds overconfidence and makes it harder to de-bias. (Gervais, 2010)
2.3.3.2 Confirmation Bias
Once the move is made, no matter what the outcome is, managers put that outcome 
in the context and seek for proper justification of their previous actions. They seek 
confirmation for their actions. This is „tendency to interpret evidence as consistent with 
one`s preexisting beliefs“ (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Teoh, 2002, p. 143)
Beliefs and judgments once formed, is what managers firmly hold unto (Barberis & 
Thaler, 2003; Rabin, 1998) and are likely to discard any new data that opposes 
established judgments, however relevant these might be (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002).
2.3.3.3 Herding effect
According to Sewell (2011), herding effect is due to need of people to socialize and 
make groups in order to survive and improve well-being through evolution. Socializing 
is crucial for information exchange, which is one of the most important resources.
There is evidence that people are more likely to take higher risks when acting in a 
group. Being a member of a group reduces feelings of insecurity and anxiety over 
decisions. Company of other people changes risk behavior of each group member. 
(Chou & Nordgren, 2016)
According to Shiller (2000) information exchanged between people in face-to-face 
conversations has higher impact than the same information exchanged in other ways. 
It is due to capacity of face expressions, or tone of voice to provoke specific emotions 
with participants of conversation. 
Acting in group benefits each member, since his capacity to perform increases. On 
the other side, it can be harmful since each member is likely to follow explicitly or 
implicitly implied set of activities. (Shiller, 2000)
3. Conclusion
Effective risk management needs to account for insights from behavioral corporate 
finance, which are derived from psychology, neuroscience, and sociology. It is 
deemed necessary to approach risk taking behavior from a broader and more realistic 
perspective, instead of relying solely on standard risk approaches, which include 
relationship between risk and return, constant preferences and utility maximization. 
Significance of effective risk management increases in domain of banking industry, 
which serves as an integrator and financier of country`s economic system. It is up to 
academicians and practitioners both to gain more understanding into how human 
minds work and how managers make decisions. It will empower them to create 
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environments in which managers are compelled to behave in the best interest of all 
stakeholders involved.
Managers themselves, should strive to understand and get to know themselves and 
members of their executive boards better. In that way, they will be better able to 
control their own decision making and establish better control over themselves.
This study shed a light on the suggested approach to risk management, draw attention 
to its importance and hopefully developed interest from professionals in academics 
and real sector. Future research should definitely include development of model of 
managerial decision making under risk in commercial banking, since it would help 
standardization of risk management processes.
References
• Abdulnabi, N. L. (2014). Prospect Theory in Decision Making Process. Eastern 
Mediterranean University, Gazimagusa, North Cyprus.
• Ariely, D. (2008). Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our 
Decisions. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
• Baker, H. K., & Nofsinger, J. R. (2002). Psychological Biases of Investors. Financial 
Services Review, 11(2), 97.
• Baker, M. P., & Wurgler, J. (2011). Behavioral Corporate Finance: An Updated 
Survey (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 1909013). Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1909013
• Barberis, N., & Thaler, R. (2003). Chapter 18 A survey of behavioral finance. In 
M. H. and R. M. S. G.M. Constantinides (Ed.), Handbook of the Economics of 
Finance (Vol. Volume 1, Part B, pp. 1053–1128). Elsevier. Retrieved from http://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574010203010276
• Berneheim, D. B. (2009). The Psychology and Neurobiology of Judgment and 
Decision Making: What`s in it for Economists? In Neuroeconomics: Decision 
Making and the Brain (1st ed., pp. 115–125). London U.K.: Elsevier Inc.
• Bessis, J. (2002). Risk Management in Banking (2nd ed.). West Sussex, England: 
John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
• Bloom, P. (2014, February). The War on Reason. Retrieved March 24, 2014, 
from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/03/the-war-on-
reason/357561/
• Camerer, C. F. (2007). Neuroeconomics: using neuroscience to make economic 
predictions. Economic Journal, 117, C26–C42.
• Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2002). Corporate governance in finance: Concepts and 
international observations. Financial Sector Governance: The Roles of the Public 
and Private Sectors, 17–50.
• Chen, J. J., Zhang, H., Xiao, X., & Li, W. (2011). Financial crisis and executive 
remuneration in banking industry - an analysis of five British banks. Applied 
Financial Economics, 21, 1779–1791. http://doi.org/10.1080/09603107.2011.5877
69
• Chou, E. Y., & Nordgren, L. F. (2016). Safety in Numbers: Why the Mere Physical 
Presence of Others Affects Risk-taking Behaviors. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making.
• Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., & Teoh, S. H. (2002). Investor psychology in capital 
markets: evidence and policy implications. Journal of Monetary Economics, 
49(1), 139–209. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00091-5
International Conference on Economic and Social Studies (ICESoS’16)
178 ICESoS 2016 - Proceedings Book
• Dervishi, A., & Ibish, K. (2014). Decision making under the conditions of risk and 
uncertainty in some enterprises of Prishtina and Ferizaj. European Scientific 
Journal.
• Erner, C., Klos, A., & Langer, T. (2013). Can prospect theory be used to predict an 
investor`s willingness to pay? Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(2013), 1960–1973.
• Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnosn, S. M. (2000). The affect 
heuristic in judgements of risks and benefits. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 13, 1–17.
• García-Marco, T., & Robles-Fernández, M. D. (2008). Risk-taking behaviour and 
ownership in the banking industry: The Spanish evidence. Journal of Economics 
and Business, 60(4), 332–354. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.04.008
• Gervais, S. (2010). Capital Budgeting and Other Investment Decions. In K. H. 
Baker & J. R. Nofsinger, Behavioral Finance. Hoboken, Wiley.
• Glaser, M., Noth, M., & Weber, M. (2003). Behavioral Finance. In Blackwell 
Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making - Chapter 26 (p. 32). Mannheim, 
Germany: Lehrstuhl für Bankbetriebslehre Universität Mannheim. Retrieved from 
http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/publications/dp03-14.pdf
• Hadžić, Z. (2015). Intuition in Decision Making: Comparison of Middle-Eastern and 
European Decision Making Styles (Master Thesis). International Burch University, 
Sarajevo, B&H.
• Halaba, A., & Ilgun, E. (2014). Behavioural Finance: The Review of Basic Concepts 
(1st ed.). Sarajevo, B&H: IBU Publications.
• Helson, H. (1964). Adaptation-level theory: an experimental and systematic 
approach to behavior. Harper and Row: New York.
• Hillson, D. (2014). Perspectives on risk management and behavioural finance - 
Perspective 1. Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 7(2), 114–116.
• Isenman, L. D. (1997). Toward an understanding of intuition and its importance in 
scientific endeavor. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 40(3), 395–403.
• Jarboui, S., & Boujelbene, Y. (2012). The Behavioral Approach and the Rationality 
of Economic Decisions: Application to Banks Managers. In M. Nejati & M. Nejati, 
Global Business and Management Research : An International Journal Vol. 4, 
No. 2 (pp. 205–219). Universal-Publishers.
• Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow (First). New York: Farrar, Straus, and 
Giroux.
• Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: 
Heuristics and biases.
• Kaplan, S. N., Klebanov, M. M., & Sorensen, M. (2011). Which CEO Charecteristics 
and Abilities Matter? Journal of Finance, Forthcoming.
• Korte, R. F. (2003). Biases in decision making and implications for human resource 
development. Advances in Developing Human Resources, 5(4), 440–457.
• Krohling, R. A., & Souza, T. T. M. de. (2012). Combining prospect theory and fuzzy 
numbers to multi-criteria decision making. Expert Systems with Applications, 
39(2012), 11487–11493.
• Marous, J. (2015, November 9). Securing Banking’s Role as 
Relationship Gatekeeper. Retrieved March 22, 2016, from 
about:reader?url=http%3A%2F%2Fthefinancialbrand.com%2F55226%2Fbanking-
customer-experience-loyalty-gatekeeper%2F
• Rabin, M. (1998). Psychology and Economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 
36(1), 11–46.
• Riabacke, A. (2006). Managerial decision making under risk and uncertainty. 
IAENG International Journal of Computer Science, 32(4), 453–459.
179ICESoS 2016 - Proceedings Book
Regional Economic Development: Entrepreneurship and Innovation
• Santos, L. R., & Chen, K. M. (2009). The Evolution of Rational and Irrational 
Economic Behavior: Evidence and Insight from a Non-human Primate Species. 
In Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain (1st ed., pp. 81–93). London 
U.K.: Elsevier Inc.
• Schmidt, R. H., & Tyrell, M. (1997). Financial systems, corporate finance and 
corporate governance. European Financial Management, 3(3), 333–361.
• Sewell, R. (2011). Psychology of Successful Investing. U.K.: University of Cambridge.
• Shen, C.-H., & Chih, H.-L. (2005). Investor protection, prospect theory, and earnings 
management: An international comparison of the banking industry. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 29, 2675–2697. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.10.004
• Shermerhon, J. R. (1996). Management and Organization Behaviour. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons.
• Shiller, R. J. (2000). Irrational Exuberance. Princeton, New Yersey: Princeton 
University Press.
• Simon, H. A. (1955). A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 69(1), 99–118.
• Tirole, J. (2006). The theory of corporate finance. New Jersey, USA: Princeton 
University Press.
• Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejla, L. R. (1998). A Behavioral Agency Model of 
Managerial Risk Taking. Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 133–153.
• Woiceshyn, J. (2014). Making Effective Decisions by Integrating. In J. Liebowitz 
(Ed.), Bursting the Big Data Bubble: The Case for Intuition Based Decision Making 
(1st ed.). Boca Raton, 711 Third Avenue, New York: Auerbach Publications.

